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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. DOES AN ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE CONTRAC-
TORS WITH AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND FINAN-
CIAL STAKE IN THE CLEANUP OF A U.S. MILI-
TARY BASE IN ITALY, WHICH IS PROJECTED TO
BE CARRIED OUT WITH A GENETICALLY-ENGI-
NEERED MICROBE, HAVE STANDING UNDER THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
("NEPA") TO CHALLENGE THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE'S ("DOD") FAILURE TO COMPLETE A
FULL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
("EIS") FOR THE CLEANUP?
II. DOES NEPA APPLY EXTRATERRITORIALLY TO
REQUIRE DOD TO COMPLY WITH NEPA'S EIS RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR THE CLEANUP, AND DO THE
PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114 PRE-
CLUDE NEPA APPLICATION TO THE PROJECT?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia is reported in the Record at page
2.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
SIONS INVOLVED
The following constitutional provisions are set forth in
the Appendix: U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S. Const. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1; U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
The following statutory sections are set forth in the Ap-
pendix: Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988);
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331,
4332(2)(C), 4332(2)(F), 4332(2)(H), 4332(2)(I), 4344 (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The United States Army, under the auspices of the De-
partment of Defense ("DoD"), has embarked on a plan to
decommission many of the nuclear missile bases it has main-
tained on the Italian peninsula since the end of World War II.
(R.2). This plan includes a cleanup of substances which may
have been placed on the sites through Army operations. Id.
Though the program will render the selected bases completely
inactive, the U.S. Government has no definite plans to relin-
quish control over the sites. Id. An Army custodial staff will
remain to perform basic maintenance and deter vandalism. Id.
The U.S. may eventually turn control over the decommis-
sioned areas to the Italians, but the two governments are still
working out the details of a transfer process. (R.2).
The first of these missile bases scheduled for decommis-
sioning and subject of this action lies just outside Venice.
(R.2). The Army has exercised exclusive control over the Ven-
ice base since 1945, and has never opened it to public access.
Id. For the past two decades the Army has employed the site
solely for missile storage. Id. A 1989 Army investigation of en-
vironmental conditions at the Venice base uncovered a high
level of missile fuel contamination in the topsoil to a depth of
two feet. (R.3). The fuel is toxic in high doses, and probably
1992]
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carcinogenic after long-term exposure. (R.3).
The Army intends to rely solely on its own resources to
clean the contaminated soil at the Venice site, which will pre-
clude outside monitoring of the process. (R.3). It plans to have
its own employees apply "Biocore" to the fuel-soaked soil.
Id.Biocore is a genetically-engineered microorganism devel-
oped by the Army and thus far subjected only to its own tests
in laboratories and at a government greenhouse.
Id.Theoretically, Biocore subsists on missile fuel alone; once
released into the soil it should multiply only until it exhausts
the contaminant, at which time it should die and pose no fur-
ther threat to the environment. Id. These findings, however,
are not conclusive. (R.3).
The Army would like to treat the Venice site as a proving
ground for Biocore in its first field test, and use the data it
gathers to file its first pre-manufacturing notice as required by
section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA").
(R.3). A successful test would also be indispensable to pro-
moting the use of Biocore at similar sites around the world.
Id. Because Venice is the first cleanup in the overall decom-
missioning plan, the methods and standards selected there
will strongly influence those used at similar sites. (R.2).
In March 1990, the Army completed a twenty-page
"Summary Environmental Analysis of the Venice, Italy, Mis-
sile Site Clean-up," to comply with sections 2-3(b) and 2-
4(b)(ii) of Executive Order 12,114. (R.3). The Army never re-
leased the report for public comment, but it did make the
document available to Congress after announcing the plan to
use Biocore at Venice. (R.3-4). Beside the finding of no signifi-
cant impact in the laboratory, this brief assessment consti-
tutes the Army's only environmental investigation of the im-
pact of using Biocore. (R.4).
Six pages of the document were devoted to a review the
history of the Venice site and the detection of the contamina-
tion in the soil. (R.3). Another six pages described the devel-
opment of Biocore and the Army's reports of success in the
controlled environments of laboratories and government
greenhouses. Id. In the remaining seven pages, the Army com-
pared its cost estimates for three methods of dealing with the
[Vol. 9
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contamination. (R.3).
For the first method, a Biocore cleanup, the Army claims a
cost of only $500,000, despite the fact that it has never been
used in an actual project. (R.3). The second alternative con-
sidered was to leave the contamination in place, which sup-
posedly would entail only the minimal cost of periodic verifi-
cation that the fuel has not leached away. Id. However, the
Army's assessment omitted the fact that the fuel washes with
the soil during heavy rains, and that the Venice base is lo-
cated on a 100-year floodplain. Id. Lastly, the report ex-
amined the industry standard method of incinerating the
tainted soil and replacing it with clean fill, at a cost of $5 mil-
lion. Id. Incineration is the preferred means of cleanup for
this type of contamination because of its safety and effective-
ness. Id. In addition, the Army's total price tag for incinera-
tion should prove accurate in light of the abundant cost data
for incineration cleanup at similar sites. (R.3).
Nevertheless, a DoD official testified before Congress that
the Biocore cleanup is planned as part of the Department's
program for fiscal 1992. (R.5). Army personnel have been se-
lected to apply Biocore, and their superiors have told them to
expect to do the job in the summer of 1992. (R.6). Though the
Army usually does not consider a decision "final" until it is-
sues travelling orders two to thirty days prior to departure,
$500,000 has been budgeted for the administrative expenses.
(R.5-6). Furthermore, the officer in charge of travelling orders
said in deposition that only court intervention would prevent
him from issuing them as planned. (R.6).
In the fall of 1990, the Defense Contractors Association
("DCA") and Environmental Friends, Inc. ("EF") challenged
the Army's planned use of Biocore for the Venice cleanup, in
separate actions filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. (R.4-5). The Secretary of the
DoD was the named defendant in his capacity as agency head.
(R.2). Plaintiffs based jurisdiction on the Army's alleged viola-
tion of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), in
failing to publish a full Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for the use of Biocore in its cleanup program. (R.4-5).
Specifically, DCA believes that the Army's summary assess-
1992]
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ment cannot detail appropriately the ramifications of an un-
controlled release of Biocore into the environment. (R.5). Fur-
thermore, they contend that a formal EIS, prepared according
to Council on Environmental Quality regulations, would re-
veal that Biocore is still too experimental for the cleanup pro-
gram. (R.5).
DCA is an association of over 3,000 defense contractors,
with headquarters in Arlington County, Virginia. (R.5.). Sev-
enty percent of DoD's annual contracting budget goes to DCA
members. Id. In its mission statement, DCA advocates "a
partnership of the public and the private sectors[] which re-
sults in sustainable policies of all kinds." Id. An associated
"statement of explanation" details "a safe and healthy envi-
ronment" as one of eight laudable social goals that benefit
from such a private partnership. (R.5).
DCA has filed affidavits from two member companies,
Grant General Services, Inc., and Hisson Earthclean, Inc.
(R.5). Both companies have the resources and capacity to per-
form the Venice cleanup with conventional technologies. Id.
For them, Biocore is not an option, because the U.S. Govern-
ment's ownership of the microbe precludes application by pri-
vate contractors. (R.5).
Grant General Services is a large contracting company of
long standing that provides DoD with soil purification, among
a variety of other services. (R.5). It is currently under contract
with DoD to perform these services at several bases in north-
ern Italy. Id. Hisson specializes in soil decontamination at
military bases. Id. It is a relatively new company that intends
to expand its operations to Europe. (R.5).
The District Court consolidated the actions brought by
DCA and EF. (R.1). DoD moved for summary judgment under
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in two respects. (R.5). First,
DoD claimed neither plaintiff has standing to sue. Id. Second,
DoD denied that NEPA applies outside the United States,
and therefore cannot compel the Army to file an EIS prior to
using Biocore. (R.6).
The District Court denied defendant's motion on both
counts, ruling that both DCA and EF have standing, and that
(Vol. 9
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NEPA applies extraterritorially to the Venice cleanup, a ma-
jor action by DoD. (R.6-7). As a result, the court ordered DoD
to perform the cleanup just as it would within the United
States. (R.8). DoD now appeals the denial of summary judg-
ment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth
Circuit. (R.1).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The denial of the Department of Defense's ("DoD") mo-
tion for summary judgment must be affirmed, because De-
fense Contractor Association ("DCA") has standing under the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and NEPA
applies extraterritorially to the Venice base cleanup. Regard-
ing standing, DoD's failure to file an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS") under NEPA for the Venice site cleanup
causes DCA an injury in fact to both environmental and fi-
nancial interests. The threatened harm from the release of a
genetically-engineered microorganism at the Venice site will
occur in the region of northern Italy where employees of DCA
member businesses work, and is injury in fact to an environ-
mental interest which falls within NEPA's zone of interests.
DCA's financial stake in the cleanup method used at the
Venice site in no way precludes DCA from asserting an envi-
ronmental interest in the Venice site cleanup. Rather, such a
stake in tandem with DCA's expertise in the area of toxic
cleanup reinforces DCA's status as an appropriate party to
the action. DCA's threatened harm is readily traceable to
DoD's failure to file an EIS, since DoD would not undertake
the cleanup using Biocore if adverse environmental conse-
quences were brought to light by an EIS. The threatened
harm to DCA is readily redressable by this court, since no se-
rious effects from the use of Biocore will be overlooked if DoD
prepares a complete EIS.
NEPA's procedural requirements do apply extraterritori-
ally. Viewing the act as a whole, three statutory uses of
broadly inclusive language indicate NEPA's extraterritorial
applicability. First, sections 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(F) are mu-
tually applicable, and require all agencies to recognize and
1992]
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consider international environmental problems when imple-
menting their programs. Second, section 102(2)(C) requires an
EIS for all major federal actions affecting the human environ-
ment. This section's application is not limited to "the Ameri-
can environment." Third, NEPA Sections 2, 101(a), 102(2)(A),
and 102(2)(C)(iv) define their requirements using the word
"man." "Man" is defined as "the human race," not as
"Americans."
Administratively, the Council for Environmental Quality
("CEQ") has the responsibility to interpret and administer
NEPA. CEQ has consistently interpreted NEPA to apply ex-
traterritorially. Finally, NEPA's legislative history is replete
with notations concerning congressional intent to create an
environmental statute with an international focus. There is no
case law on point, but case law does indicate judicial interpre-
tation of NEPA's provisions favors extraterritorial
application.
Moreover, despite the Army's alleged compliance with
Executive Order ("E.O.") 12,114, the Order does not modify
NEPA's requirement of an EIS for the Venice base cleanup,
for two reasons. First, the E.O. does not have the force of law,
since it was promulgated as an exercise of the general execu-
tive power to further presidential environmental policies, and
not pursuant to statutory authority. Because the rule of law is
paramount, E.O. 12,114 cannot trump a duly enacted law such
as NEPA. Second, even if E.O. 12,114 has exclusive effect
outside of U.S. possessions, the degree of Army control over
the base and the intended extraterritorial extent of NEPA
makes the site a possession for purposes of NEPA. Thus, both
NEPA and E.O. 12,114 cover the Venice base, and as law
NEPA must control in any aspect the two diverge.
DCA therefore demonstrates both that it has standing to
bring an action against DoD for non-compliance with NEPA's
EIS requirement, and that NEPA properly applies extraterri-
torially to the Venice base. Because these issues of material
fact are resolved in DCA's favor, the denial of DoD's motion
must be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
Appellant Department of Defense's ("DoD") motion for
summary judgment alleging lack of jurisdiction was properly
denied, because Appellee Defense Contractors Association
("DCA") has the requisite standing to bring a cause of action
under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and
because NEPA does apply to agency actions outside the
United States. According to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary judgment in
its favor "if the pleadings . . . together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
To defeat the motion, DCA first must demonstrate it has
standing under NEPA to challenge DoD's failure to file an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") in compliance with
NEPA. DCA's affidavits must set forth facts sufficient to
demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, which here amounts to a
showing of facts sufficient to confer standing. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177,
3186-87 (1990). DCA must then show that NEPA applies ex-
traterritorially as a matter of law, and therefore a genuine is-
sue exists as to what extent DoD must comply with NEPA.
I. DCA HAS STANDING SINCE ITS ENVIRONMENTAL
AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN THE VENICE SITE
CLEANUP BRING IT WITHIN NEPA'S ZONE OF IN-
TERESTS, THE HARM TO DCA'S INTERESTS IS
TRACEABLE TO DOD'S FAILURE TO COMPLETE
AN EIS ON THE CLEANUP, AND THAT HARM CAN
BE REDRESSED BY THIS COURT.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
showing necessary to establish standing in a case where an or-
ganization challenges the failure of an agency to file an EIS,
contrary to the statutory mandate of NEPA. Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, 110 S. CL. 3177 (1990). To assert a
right to judicial review under NEPA, a party must satisfy Sec-
tion 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), since
NEPA sets forth no explicit right to review. 5 U.S.C. § 702
1992]
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(1988). Section 10(a) of the APA provides: "a person suffering
any legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Id. The
Court in Lujan noted the "plaintiff must establish that the
injury he complains of ... falls within the 'zone of interests'
sought to be protected" by the statute in question to establish
that he has "suffer[ed] legal wrong" or that he is "adversely
affected or aggrieved by that action within the meaning of the
statute." Id. at 3186 (citing Clarke v. Securities Industry
Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-397 (1987)).
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit acknowledged that "the need to fully assess poten-
tial harm before a project is undertaken is a major justifica-
tion for the broad test courts have laid down for NEPA
standing." City of Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic
Safety Ass'n ("NHTSA"), 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C.Cir. 1990)
(citing City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir.
1975)). The D.C. Circuit also outlined the relationship be-
tween the zone of interests test and the constitutional stand-
ing inquiry in NHTSA, stating "[i]f a petitioner can establish
that it has suffered an injury within the zone of interests, it
will necessarily have satisfied the constitutional injury re-
quirement as well." Id. at 483 (citing City of Davis v. Cole-
man, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)).
The constitutional showing necessary for standing was set
forth in a three part test by the Supreme Court in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley
Forge, the Court found Article III requires the party who in-
vokes the court's authority "'show that he personally has suf-
fered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the puta-
tively illegal conduct of the defendant," that the injury
" 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action'" and " 'is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'" Id. at 472
(quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99 (1979) and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
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A. The Army's Failure To File An EIS Threatens DCA
With Harm To Both Environmental And Financial
Interests.
In the context of NEPA, the D.C. Circuit in NHTSA
called "'the creation of a risk that serious environmental im-
pacts will be overlooked'. . . sufficient to establish the injury
necessary for standing, 'provided that this injury is alleged by
a plaintiff that ... may be expected to suffer whatever envi-
ronmental consequences the [decision] may have.'" 912 F.2d
at 483 (citing City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th
Cir. 1975)). DoD intends to have its personnel use Biocore, a
genetically engineered microorganism ("GEM") it claims will
"eat" toxic missile fuel and which has been evaluated only
under the controlled environment of a government green-
house, in an attempt to clean up the Venice site. The Army's
failure to prepare an EIS in conjunction with the first release
application of Biocore has caused DCA two distinct injuries in
fact.
First, DCA's environmental interests are threatened with
injury primarily due to DoD's failure to file an EIS as man-
dated under NEPA, since, in the absence of such an EIS,
there has been no determination the use of Biocore is safe or
effective beyond the "summary analysis" prepared by the
Army. DCA's members who will work in the region of north-
ern Italy near the Venice site in the summer of 1992 face pos-
sible harm from the Army's use of Biocore. There is no data
available on how Biocore will react when released in the natu-
ral environment, or into the soil and air of the Venice site in
particular. Additionally, since the only comparison of conven-
tional soil purification techniques and the use of Biocore was
made in terms of the monetary costs of the two techniques, no
information on the overall social, environmental and health
costs and benefits of each method were assessed. The Su-
preme Court has found that non-economic concerns like those
of DCA in the present case, environmental interests, are well
within the purview of NEPA and fall within the statute's zone
of interest. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
See also Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
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dures (S.C.R.A.P.) v. United States, 412 U.S. 669, 686-90
(1973).
Though no precedent provides guidance on the risks at-
tendant to a release of a GEM at the site of a toxic spill, an
analogous situation exists in the area of experimental use per-
mits required under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 7 U.S.C. § 136(c) (1988). Since
1984, EPA has required "advance permission for [the] release
of genetically engineered microbial pesticides," and before
permitting experimental field use of GEM pesticides the EPA
conducts a "thorough review of the risks and benefits of such
an application." Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas
("Economic Trends"), 661 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D.D.C. 1986).
This monitoring requirement, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia noted in Economic Trends, stems from
EPA's belief that such pesticides raise "special testing con-
cerns" since such pesticides can reproduce and spread beyond
the application site. Id.
Obviously, GEM pesticides are regulated under FIFRA
and there is no such applicable statute in the present case.
But EPA's attention to monitoring in the use of GEM pesti-
cides, presumably much more benign than Biocore, only high-
lights the need for stringent examination of the Army's pro-
posed use of a genetically engineered microorganism to "eat"
toxic missile fuel. Further, a second threat, though seemingly
attenuated, may pose an even greater danger to DCA's mem-
bers. In addition to the inherent risk of unforeseen environ-
mental effects from a first release of Biocore, the second
threat flows from the fact that one or more of DCA's member
businesses very likely would be involved in the cleanup of the
site in the event of an unforeseen toxic reaction flowing from
the use of Biocore. Taking part in such a cleanup, though
clearly a financial benefit, could have dramatic ramifications
for the health and personal safety of DCA's members' employ-
ees. Just as there is no data available on how Biocore will re-
act in the field, there is no indication from the record that the
possible health consequences from contact with Biocore have
been foreseen or will be treatable.
DCA's membership strives, as one of the "social policies"
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outlined in the association's mission statement indicates, for
"a safe and healthy environment." One impetus behind enter-
ing the field of toxic waste disposal shared by many of DCA's
members is that of protecting the environment by utilizing
methods of toxic waste cleanup proven to be effective and
safe. Many of DCA's members have years of experience in
handling soil purification work, much of that experience
gained while performing cleanups for the Army similar to the
cleanup needed at the Venice site. In contrast, Biocore has
never been applied in actual use anywhere. Moreover, Biocore
will be applied by Army personnel, without any outside party
performing any quality control review.
DCA's membership will suffer financial injury as a result
of DoD's failure to prepare an EIS, since Army personnel will
handle the application, and post-application testing, of Bi-
ocore. DCA's members suffer the loss of the revenue which
could be earned in performing the soil purification needed at
the Venice site. Grant General Services already performs soil
purification and other work for the Army in northern Italy
and Hisson EarthClean, Inc. views Italy and the European
market as a whole as a potential market in which to expand
their cleanup activities. It is well established that pecuniary or
economic harm to an association or business for profit which
results from "agency action" may suffice as an injury in fact
for the purposes of standing analysis. See Clarke v. Securities
Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394 (1987).
B. Federal Courts Consistently Hold That A Party
With Genuine Environmental And Financial Inter-
ests In Challenging Agency Action Under NEPA
Has Standing To Sue For Completion Of An EIS.
Where a party establishes that it has a genuine environ-
mental interest in a controversy that cannot be "disregarded
altogether," in tandem with a financial interest for asserting
the applicability of NEPA's mandate of an EIS, the federal
courts have consistently afforded such parties standing. Re-
alty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977); Port of As-
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toria, Oregon v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979); National
Helium Corp. v. Morton. 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds 486 F.2d 995 (1973). This line of cases dove-
tails with the Supreme Court's assertion in Clarke v. Securi-
ties Industry Ass'n that the zone of interests test will provide
a right of review unless "the plaintiff's interests are so mar-
ginally related to or inconsistent with the purpose implicit in
the statute that it cannot be reasonably be assumed that Con-
gress intended to permit the suit." 479 U.S. at 399.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
that it was "'passing strange' to see the giants of the oil and
gas industry representing the public interest," yet the court
granted the plaintiff companies standing to assert noncompli-
ance with NEPA, concluding that the plaintiff companies
were not "per se disqualified to occupy this role" in National
Helium Corp. v. Morton. 455 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds 486 F.2d 995 (1973). In National He-
lium, the plaintiff helium supplier asserted standing to chal-
lenge the Secretary of the Interior's failure to file an EIS
before cancelling the government's contracts to purchase he-
lium. Id. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the action fell within
NEPA since a concern for the proper use and conservation of
depletable natural resources was encompassed by the statute.
Id.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the expressed "environ-
mental" concern of the company was not lessened by the fact
that the company had a considerable financial stake in the
matter. Id. Here, though DCA's membership does have a pe-
cuniary interest in the manner in which the cleanup at the
Venice site is performed, it also has a wealth of knowledge
and expertise regarding the alternative methods of cleanup.
DCA certainly comes within the National Helium standard
for granting standing.
A recent case further strengthens DCA's argument for
standing. In Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, the D.C. Circuit
upheld the District Court's finding that the appellant corpora-
tion, owner and operator of two buildings, had standing to
challenge the General Services Administration's ("GSA") fail-
ure to file an EIS. 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Eckerd,
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the appellant challenged a proposed project to acquire 277,000
square feet of space for a federal office building to be built in
Jackson, Mississippi, where the appellant's two buildings,
which housed a number of federal tenants, were located. Id.
The appellant alleged that it would suffer environmental in-
jury from the construction of the new building due to its im-
pact on vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Id. at 451. The D.C.
Circuit found that the appellant was not precluded from as-
serting an environmental injury in spite of its "obvious" mon-
etary interest. Id.
"[A] party is not precluded from asserting cognizable in-
jury to environmental values because his 'real' or 'obvious' in-
terest may be viewed as monetary," the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
Id. at 452. The court concluded that prohibiting private par-
ties who may not be "pure of heart" from undertaking action
to force the implementation of NEPA runs counter to the
broad Congressional purpose of assuring that environmental
values be weighed in federal decision-making. Id. at 452-53.
Though DoD's attempt to apply Biocore to the Venice
site does amount to a form of competition for the market
served by DCA's members, in Eckerd the building the GSA
sought to construct was to house federal tenants, who at the
time the suit was instituted, were already occupants of the ap-
pellant's two buildings. Id. In effect, the GSA's action in Eck-
erd would not only have closed off a market to the appellant,
but would also have taken some of its tenants away. In con-
trast, DCA urges that its member businesses operating in
northern Italy in the summer of 1992 will be injured by the
first release of a genetically-engineered, "toxic eating" mi-
crobe that has never been tested in the natural environment.
As well, they will suffer a loss of market share.
C. DCA's Threatened Injuries Are "Fairly Traceable"
To DoD's Failure To File an EIS And Are Readily
Redressable By This Court.
In NHTSA, the D.C. Circuit held that the Natural, Re-
sources Defense Council ("NRDC") had standing under
NEPA to challenge NHTSA's failure to complete an EIS in
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setting its Corporate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE") stan-
dard for model year ("MY") 1989 on global warming grounds.
912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990). NRDC alleged that NHTSA's
failure to complete an EIS in setting its CAFE standards "cre-
ated the risk that it would overlook the global climate effects
that may result from lower fuel efficiency standards for cars
manufactured in MY 1989." Id. at 493. There is a similar dan-
ger in the present case that DoD's brief Summary Analysis
will overlook the effects that may result from the use of
Biocore.
NRDC established that its members used the coastal ar-
eas in California which would be flooded due to a rise in sea
level brought on by global warming. Id. at 494. This showing,
the D.C. Circuit noted, demonstrated that the failure to pre-
pare the EIS, which could have addressed the effects of a
lower CAFE standard on global warming, "present[ed] the
risk of overlooking an environmental injury that will person-
ally affect [NRDC's] members." Id. (citing Lujan, 110 S. Ct.
3177). DCA's members who work in northern Italy in the
summer of 1992 are at risk of suffering comparable injury due
to the application of Biocore at the Venice site.
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that no prediction could
be made on the timing or scope of the injuries brought on by
global warming, adding that "the very risk that such uncer-
tainty will remain unevaluated if NHTSA does not prepare an
EIS makes the NEPA injury even greater." Id. The risk that
potential environmental harms will remain unevaluated is
central to the present case. In NHTSA, NRDC could marshal
a wealth of data on global warming to support its claim of
standing, though no consensus exists in the scientific commu-
nity on global warming. In the case at bar, by contrast, no
party except for DoD has any data on Biocore. What little
data DoD has made available is contained in a summary anal-
ysis the Army completed in order to secure approval for the
use of Biocore.
DCA need not prove that an EIS will result in a finding
that the environmental hazards associated with the use of Bi-
ocore preclude its use. The D.C. Circuit recently noted that its
precedents require only a showing of a "reasonable likelihood"
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that the agency that has failed to file an EIS would "arrive at
a different conclusion" regarding its proposed action if it were
to complete an EIS. NHTSA, 912 F.2d at 497. The D.C. Cir-
cuit found that the prospect that an agency would rescind its
proposed action if the environmental consequences of that ac-
tion were "spelled out in more detail in an EIS," "provid[ed]
the necessary showing for establishing a causal nexus" be-
tween the agency's failure to file an EIS and the petitioner's
environmental injury. Id. at 496. In view of the paucity of
data provided in the summary analysis, DCA meets the trace-
ability test.
The redressability prong of the constitutional analysis is
satisfied here, since the asserted environmental injury flows
from the failure to file an EIS. In NHTSA, the D.C. Circuit
found that the petitioner, NRDC, "need only show that an
EIS would redress its asserted injury, i.e. that any serious ef-
fects in global warming will not be overlooked." Thus, DCA
need only establish that the completion of an EIS would as-
sure that no serious effects of the use of Biocore will be over-
looked. A clear link between DCA's defining purpose and ex-
pertise in toxic cleanup and the environmental interest it
asserts in this case establish that DCA has standing to chal-
lenge DoD's failure to complete an EIS.
II. NEPA APPLIES EXTRATERRITORIALLY AND
THEREFORE REQUIRES THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE TO COMPLY FULLY WITH NEPA'S EN-
VIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
REQUIREMENTS.
NEPA's procedural requirements apply extraterritorially. 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). According to principles of statutory con-
struction, absent a contrary intent, legislation is presumed to
apply only territorially, that is, within the United States. See
generally Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("Chev-
ron"), 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("E.E.O.C.") v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S.
Ct. 1227 (1991). The presumption applies when, and only
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when, indicia of legislative intent fail to answer the extraterri-
torial question. People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (D. Haw. 1973), modified
on other grounds 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420
U.S. 1003 (1975).
Three conclusions may be drawn from indicia of legisla-
tive intent in this case. First, NEPA's broadly inclusive envi-
ronmental terminology indicates Congress intended broad en-
vironmental application. Second, the Council for
Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), the administrative branch
responsible for NEPA's interpretation, interprets NEPA to
apply abroad. And third, NEPA's legislative history reflects
congressional intent to draft NEPA's provisions to have inter-
national application. These three conclusions establish
NEPA's extraterritorial applicability and denies application of
the historical presumption against extraterritorial application
of United States statutes.
A. NEPA Applies Extraterritorially Since Congress
Drafted NEPA In Broadly Inclusive Environmental
Terms; CEQ Interprets NEPA To Apply Extraterri-
torially; And Since NEPA's Legislative History In-
dicates It Was Conceived And Drafted To Apply
Internationally.
Principles of statutory interpretation require a two tier
investigation into ascertaining congressional intent to apply a
United States statute extraterritorially. The first tier is to de-
termine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Congressional in-
tent which is unambiguously expressed "is the law and must
be given effect." Id. at n.9. The court must look to the statute
as a whole, its administrative interpretations, and its legisla-
tive history to determine if congressional intent is unambigu-
ously expressed. People of Saipan, 356 F. Supp. at 649-50.
If the first tier investigation fails to establish conclusively
congressional intent to apply the statute extraterritorially, the
second tier of the investigation requires application of the
statutory construction principle which states "legislation of
[Vol. 9
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/7
BEST APPELLEE BRIEFS
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
E.E.O.C., 111 S. Ct. at 1230 (quoting Filardo, 336 U.S. at 285).
The presumption applies when, and only when, the statute, as
a whole, its administrative interpretations, and its legislative
history do not indicate legislative intent. People of Saipan,
356 F. Supp. at 649-50.
DCA can positively establish the first tier investigation by
showing NEPA's language, administrative proceedings, and
legislative history unambiguously demonstrate NEPA was
drafted, and is interpreted, to apply extraterritorially. The
second tier investigation, and, hence, the presumption against
extraterritoriality, does not apply to bar DCA from requiring
Appellant to comply with NEPA's procedural requirements.
1. The first tier investigation reveals comprehensive
language indicating Congress' intent to apply
NEPA extraterritorially.
The first tier investigation into ascertaining congressional
intent shows NEPA's express language reveals NEPA was
meant to apply extraterritorially. See Daniel R. Mandelker,
NEPA Law and Litigation § 5:16 (1984) ("Technically . . .
NEPA does not require extraterritorial extension since agency
actions that create extraterritorial impacts arise in the United
States"). The CEQ, which is responsible for NEPA's interpre-
tation, requires "[NEPA's] provisions . . . must be read to-
gether as a whole in order to comply with the spirit and letter
of the law." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1990). Viewing the act as a
whole, three statutory uses of broadly inclusive language indi-
cate NEPA's extraterritorial applicability.
First, all provisions of section 102(2), including 102(2)(C),
apply to all agencies. This statutory fact is evidenced by use
of the conjunctive word "and" between sections 102(2)(H) and
102(2)(I). 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(H), 4332(2)(I) (1988). Addi-
tionally, section 102(2)(F) states "all agencies of the Federal
Government shall ... recognize the worldwide and long-range
character of environmental problems. . . . 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(F) (1988). This language indicates all federal agencies
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must recognize and consider international environmental
problems when implementing their programs.
Since sections 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(F) both apply to fed-
eral agencies, these agencies must include international envi-
ronmental impacts in their Environmental Impact State-
ments. See generally Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of
NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Requirement, 74
Mich. L. Rev. 349, 360-64 (1975).
Second, section 102(2)(C) states
all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . include
in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official....
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Significantly, Congress chose
not to say "affecting the quality of the Nation's environment."
If Congress had wanted to limit jurisdictionally section
102(2)(C)'s reach to national borders, it could have expressly
so stated.
Third, NEPA section 2 states
[tihe purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment; to promote ef-
forts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the envi-
ronment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man. ...
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). Section 101(a) states
Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activ-
ity on the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment ... and recognizing further the critical im-
portance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government . . . to use all practicable means and mea-
sures ... to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in [I harmony ....
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42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988). The word "man" is used in two
other NEPA sections: 102(2)(A) (agencies must "utilize a sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary approach . . . in planning and deci-
sionmaking which may have an impact on man's environ-
ment") and 102(2)(C)(iv) (an EIS must contain a statement
on "the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity").
The word "man" is defined as "the human race." Web-
ster's New Collegiate Dictionary 697 (1974). "Man" is not de-
fined ethnocentrically as "Americans." And, again, if Congress
had wanted to limit NEPA applicability to Americans, it
could have so expressly stated. Further, "biosphere" is defined
as "the part of the world in which life can exist." Id. at 111
(emphasis added). Thus, these words show Congress intended
NEPA to assert the United States' responsibility to the
world's environment.
Reading NEPA as a whole act, as CEQ regulations re-
quire, NEPA indicates 1) all federal agencies must recognize
and consider international environmental problems when im-
plementing their international programs; 2) NEPA requires
EIS's for affects on the human environment, not only the
American environment; and 3) NEPA requires an environ-
mentally broad outlook, which encompasses the entire human
race. DCA has positively established NEPA's express language
reveals NEPA applies extraterritorially.
2. The first tier investigation shows CEQ consist-
ently interprets NEPA to apply extraterritorially.
The first tier investigation into ascertaining congressional
intent shows that the CEQ, the administrative agency respon-
sible for NEPA's interpretation, consistently interprets NEPA
to apply extraterritorially. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341, 4344 (1988); 40
C.F.R. §§ 1500.1 and 1515.2 (1990). Judicial analysis of an
agency's interpretation of a statute follows a two step process.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. First, if agency authority to regu-
late in the ambiguous area is explicitly authorized by statute,
agency regulations are given significant weight in deciding the
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issue unless the regulations are "arbitrary, capricious, or man-
ifestly contrary to statute." Id. at 844. If agency authority to
regulate in the ambiguous area is implicitly authorized by
statute, the agency's interpretation of the statute will be
awarded judicial deference "whenever decision as to the
meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling con-
flicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon
more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters sub-
jected to agency regulations." Id.
DCA stipulates NEPA has not explicitly delegated au-
thority to CEQ to issue regulations concerning extraterritorial
application of NEPA. However, NEPA Section 204(3) gives
CEQ explicit authority to supervise NEPA's application. 42
U.S.C. § 4344(3) (1988). Commensurate with that responsibil-
ity is the implicit authority to interpret NEPA's provisions.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission ("NRDC v. NRC"), 647 F.2d 1345, 1386
n.156 (1981). Therefore, CEQ interpretation of NEPA on the
issue of extraterritoriality must be awarded judicial deference
in this analysis.
CEQ has consistently interpreted NEPA to apply extra-
territorially. Most importantly, in 1977, CEQ Chairman Rus-
sell W. Peterson released a public statement stating NEPA's
extraterritorial application was conclusively established by the
statute's express language. Memorandum on the Application
of the EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad of
Major Federal Actions ("Memorandum"), 42 Fed. Reg.
61,068 (1977). Specifically, the Memorandum notes
[NEPA] contains no express or implied geographic limita-
tion of environmental impacts to the United States or to
any other area. Indeed, such a limitation would be incon-
sistent with the plain language of NEPA, [and] its legisla-
tive purpose ....
[T]he term 'human environment' in section 102(2)(C) re-
flects an intent to cover environmental impacts beyond
U.S. borders. This interpretation is consistent with
NEPA's stated purpose [contained in Section 101(a)]....
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Applying the EIS requirement to impacts abroad also im-
plements the mandate in section 102[(2)(F)] to all agen-
cies to 'recognize the worldwide and long range character
of environmental problems. In sum, the broad language of
Section 102(2)(C) as well as the explicit congressional de-
termination that our national environmental policy must
have a global perspective gives section 102(2)(C) a wide
scope....
The Council has consistently applied NEPA to U.S. inter-
national activities and has urged federal agencies to rec-
ognize [NEPA's] global perspective.
Id. See also Legal Advisory Committee, Report to President's
Council on Environmental Quality at 13-17 (1971); Memo-
randum from Charles Warren, Chairman, to Heads of Agen-
cies, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,722 (1979).
Agency interpretation shows NEPA was specifically
designed to encompass an international environmental. focus.
DCA has positively established that CEQ affirmatively inter-
prets NEPA to apply extraterritorially.
3. The first tier investigation shows congressional in-
tent to provide an international environmental fo-
cus to NEPA's provisions.
The first tier investigation into ascertaining congressional
intent shows NEPA's legislative history is replete with nota-
tions concerning congressional intent to create an environ-
mental statute with an international focus. These notations
begin with the 1968 Congressional White Paper on a Na-
tional Policy for the Environment ("White Paper"). 115
Cong. Rec. 29,078 (1969). The White Paper stated
"[e]nvironmental quality and productivity shall be considered
in a worldwide context, extending in time from the present to
the long-term future." Id. at 29,081-82. Later, testimony at
Senate and House hearings produced pointed indications
NEPA must take an international scope.
The complexity of the earth's ecosystem and its compo-
nent parts of individual ecosystems makes understanding
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it and the management of it a massive challenge....
Today we are manipulating an extremely complex system:
The ecosystems of the earth .... We need to study eco-
systems in advance and work out the strategies of living
with the landscape.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2755-56. Additionally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-
378 indicated
testimony at the hearing also stressed the importance of
the international aspects of the environmental problem. It
is an unfortunate fact that many and perhaps most forms
of environmental pollution cross international boundaries.
• . . The international aspects are clearly a major part of
the question which the [CEQ] would have to confront....
H.R. Rep. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2757.
Finally, congressional intent concerning NEPA's interna-
tional scope is further demonstrated in the statement that
"[i]mplicit in [Section 201, establishing an annual reporting
requirement to Congress] is the understanding that the inter-
national implications of our current activities will also be con-
sidered, inseparable as they are from the purely national con-
sequence of our actions." H.R. Rep. No. 91-378, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2759. Legislative
history shows NEPA was contemplated as an international
environmental statute. The drafters intended NEPA to be so
applied. DCA has positively established NEPA's legislative
history reveals NEPA applies extraterritorially.
Case law shows the courts have not addressed a situation
similar to DCA's situation. However, case law does indicate
judicial interpretation of NEPA's provisions is favorable to-
wards extraterritorial application. Specifically, the courts have
addressed extraterritorial application of NEPA in three basic
areas.
First, NEPA does not have extraterritorial application
where an international treaty signed by the United States and
a subject country exists. Second, NEPA does not have extra-
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territorial application where congressional mandate expressly
preempts application of any secondary statutory provisions or
regulations. Finally, NEPA does have extraterritorial applica-
tion to a United States Trust Territory. None of these catego-
ries is dispositive on the issue before the court in this appeal.
In those cases holding NEPA does not have extraterrito-
rial application where an international treaty signed by the
United States and a subject country exists, the cases uni-
formly base their findings on the existence of the subject
treaty. In Greenpeace, USA v. Stone, the district court re-
fused to apply NEPA when a joint United States and Federal
Republic of West Germany treaty agreement provided for
elimination of the United States' unitary chemical munitions
retaliatory stockpile by transporting it from German territory
to Johnson Atoll, located 800 miles southwest of Hawaii. 748
F. Supp. 749, 752 (D. Haw. 1990). The district court noted
"[t]he existence of this agreement .. . is an important consid-
eration in determining whether [the Army] complied with
NEPA under the specific facts of this case... ." Id. at 758 n.7.
In addition, the district court stated that any inquiry into
NEPA's extraterritorial application "must take into consider-
ation the foreign policy implications of applying NEPA within
a foreign nation's borders to affect decisions made by the
President in a purely foreign policy matter." Id. at 759 (em-
phasis in original). The court stressed its holding applied only
to the specific facts presented in the case. Id.
Extraterritorial application of NEPA will not sabotage
foreign policy. CEQ has stated "[EIS's based on wholly extra-
territorial conduct] do not dictate actions on foreign soil or
impose U.S. requirements on foreign countries; instead, they
guide U.S. decisionmakers in determining U.S. policies and
actions. . . ." Memorandum on the Application of the EIS
Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major
Federal Actions, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (1977). NEPA's regula-
tions require compliance with the Freedom of Information Act
and contain procedures that ensure the safety of information
vital to foreign policy or national security concerns. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1515.5 and 1515.10 (1990). See generally 40 C.F.R. Part
1515 (1990).
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Further, the Eighth Circuit in Defenders of Wildlife,
Friends of Animals and Their Environment v. Lujan, in up-
holding extraterritorial application of the Endangered Species
Act, which has interpretational problems similar to NEPA,
stated "the [Endangered Species] Act is directed at the ac-
tions of federal agencies, and not at the actions of sovereign
nations. Congress may decide its concerns for foreign relations
outweighs its concern for foreign wildlife; we, however, will
not make such a decision on its behalf." 911 F.2d 117, 125
(8th Cir. 1990).
This statement applies to NEPA as well. NEPA's envi-
ronmental protection provisions apply to "major federal ac-
tions," not foreign nations. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). If
Congress wanted to curtail NEPA's application abroad, it
would have so expressly stated. Congress' failure to curtail ex-
pressly extraterritorial application of NEPA requires DoD to
perform its duty under section 102(2)(C). Id.
The seminal case which holds NEPA does not have extra-
territorial application where congressional mandate preempts
application of any secondary statutory provisions or regula-
tions is NRDC v. NRC. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
complex issue in this case, to determine if NEPA applied to
require an EIS for sale of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines,
was resolved against extraterritorial application because the
court felt that "[w]ithin the language of the statute, solicitude
for the President's prerogative in foreign relations dictates
that NEPA's putative extra-territorial reach be curbed in the
case of nuclear exports. . . ." Id. at 1348 (emphasis added).
The court's use of the word "putative," however, indicates ex-
traterritorial application of NEPA is commonly assumed. Id.
Thus, the court's holding is an exception to a commonly as-
sumed or accepted fact - NEPA applies extraterritorially.
Simply interpreted, the District Court concluded the
Atomic Energy Act required the Commission to defer to the
executive branch's decision in extending foreign export li-
censes for nuclear reactors. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1954),
amended by The Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §
3201 (1978); Id. at 1359. Then, the court concluded NEPA it-
self requires deference to any executive branch decisions
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firmly rooted in foreign policy considerations. Id. at 1366
(quoting NEPA Section 102(2)(F): "[all federal agencies must]
... consistent with the foreign policy of the United States,
lend appropriate support to . . . programs designed to maxi-
mize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing
a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4331(2)(F) (1988) (emphasis added).
In so holding, the court explicitly found "only that NEPA
does not apply to NRC nuclear export licensing decisions -
and not necessarily that the EIS requirement is inapplicable
to some other kind of major federal action abroad. Id. (em-
phasis added). By its own words, NRDC v. NRC's holding is
an exception to the rule, and thus does not apply to the case
at bar.
However, two conclusions may be drawn from the appel-
late court's language. First, courts "putatively" accept extra-
territorial application of NEPA, and second, NEPA should
bow to executive branch foreign policy considerations. This
putative acceptance applies in the present case to require
DoD's compliance with NEPA's EIS requirements. Further,
the present case does not contain foreign policy considerations
steeped in relations with foreign nations. It simply requires
DoD to comply with procedural requirements in activities af-
fecting the environment in areas which it controls.
In those cases holding NEPA applies to United States
Trust Territories, People of Enewetak v. Laird establishes the
first tier of the investigative framework for ascertaining if
NEPA applies extraterritorially, determining express congres-
sional intent. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973). In holding
NEPA's EIS requirements extend to U.S. federal agency ac-
tivities in a United States Trust Territory, the court stated
"NEPA is framed in expansive language that clearly evidences
a concern for all persons subject to federal action which has a
major impact on their environment - not merely United
States citizens located in the fifty states. . . ." Id. at 816-19.
After noting, first, NEPA is written in expansive, or broad,
language, and second, this broad language is found throughout
NEPA's legislative history, the court concluded "it is reasona-
ble to conclude that the Congress intended NEPA to apply in
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all areas under its exclusive control." Id.
People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of the Interior
establishes the second tier of the investigative framework for
ascertaining if NEPA applies extraterritorially, determining
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 356
F. Supp. at 649-50. The district court affirmed its earlier deci-
sion in Enewetak and noted "the language and legislative his-
tory of NEPA evidence[] a congressional intent to apply the
statute to all areas under United States control." Id. at 648.
This shows the canon of construction which requires a pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of NEPA does
not become an issue. Id.
Thus, according to Enewetak and People of Saipan, once
DCA positively establishes NEPA's language and legislative
history evidence congressional intent the statute applies ex-
traterritorially, the first investigative tier, investigating ex-
press legislative intent, ends. The second tier, however, clamp-
ing the presumption against extraterritoriality down on the
issues, never begins, since the analysis concludes in finding
NEPA applies extraterritorially. In sum, DCA has shown that
NEPA's express language viewed in the context of the act as a
whole, administrative interpretation of its provisions, and
NEPA's history all evidence congressional intent to apply
NEPA extraterritorially.
B. Executive Order 12,114 Cannot Be Construed Con-
trary To NEPA And Its EIS Requirements, Because
The Order Does Not Have The Force Of Law And
Does Not Apply Exclusively To The Venice Base As
A U.S. Possession.
Because NEPA does apply extraterritorially, Executive
Order ("E.O.") 12,114 does not control the appropriate envi-
ronmental evaluations for the proposed cleanup. Exec. Order
No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988). President Carter promulgated this order, entitled "En-
vironmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions," by vir-
tue of the authority vested in him by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and as President. Exec. Order No.
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12,114 pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1988). Despite this reference to the "laws," however, the
order is based on authority independent of any statute. Id. §
1-1.
The executive power, aside from that associated with the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
derives from two separate provisions of the Constitution.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-
88 (1951). The first is the general grant of executive power in
Article II, Section 1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The second
provision charges the President with the duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," the "Laws" being those
duly enacted by Congress, in which the Constitution vests all
legislative powers. Id. art. II, § 3; Id. art. I, § 1. A valid exer-
cise of executive power must be based on one of these consti-
tutional authorities.
E.O. 12,114 cannot be construed to have the force of law.
If the President issues an executive order under statutory
mandate or a delegation of authority from Congress, it has le-
gal effect; otherwise it is construed as a declaration of presi-
dential policy. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526
F.2d 228, 234-36 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Nat'l
Ass'n of Meat Purveyors v. Butz, 424 U.S. 996 (1976). Butz
concerned a challenge to revisions in USDA beef grading regu-
lations. Id. at 231. In part, the complaint alleged that the
USDA had prepared an inadequate statement on the infla-
tionary effect of the regulations, contrary to E.O. 11,821. Id. at
231. The Order was based on no specific source of authority
other than the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and was issued to manage agency action. Id. at 235. For this
reason, the Eighth Circuit ruled that E.O. 11,821 was simply a
means to implement the President's personal economic poli-
cies. Id. at 235-36. As such, the Order was not a "legal frame-
work enforceable by private civil action," and could not be
ascribed the force of law. Id. at 236.
E.O. 12,114 is an analogous statement of the President's
personal environmental policies. Like E.O. 11,821, it draws its
authority only from the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Just as E.O. 11,821 related to economic policy, E.O.
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12,114 was intended to reconcile the often competing concerns
of environmental preservation, foreign policy, and export com-
petitiveness. See Council on Environmental Quality, Execu-
tive Order 12,114; Implementing and Explanatory Docu-
ments, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,722 (1979); see also Sue D. Sheridan,
Note, The Extraterritorial Application of NEPA Under Ex-
ecutive Order 12,114, 13 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 173 (1980).
E.O. 12,114 effects only a presidential policy and was not is-
sued pursuant to statutory authority, so it does not have the
force of law. Therefore, it does not fall under the president's
power to execute the laws, but is part of an exercise of general
executive power. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
This power does not include the power to legislate. Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 587.
NEPA, however, does have the force of law, and applies
outside the United States to major federal actions. To ascribe
to the E.O. any power to preempt, modify or exclude NEPA
requirements would be tantamount to according the Order the
force of law, and a fortiori the President legislative power.
This contravenes fundamental notions of the separation of
powers. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J. concur-
ring). Therefore, E.O. 12,114 must defer to NEPA in any re-
spect the two are incompatible, which mandates the prepara-
tion of an EIS for the Venice cleanup pursuant to NEPA
requirements.
Even assuming for sake of argument that E.O. 12,114 is
the "exclusive and complete determination of the procedural
and other actions to be taken by Federal agencies . . . with
respect to the environment outside the United States, its ter-
ritories and possessions[,]" the Venice base would still be cov-
ered by NEPA because it is a U.S. possession within the am-
bit of that statute. E.O. 12,114 § 1-1. Localities outside the
sovereign territory of the United States will be considered
"possessions" for the purposes of a statutory scheme, if they
are under U.S. control and the statute's coverage extends to
such areas. Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377,386-90
(1948), reh'g denied 336 U.S. 928 (1949). Since NEPA does
cover territory outside the U.S., the question remains as to
the degree of control required to qualify the Venice base as a
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"possession."
Vermilya-Brown concerned whether the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act ("FLSA") could apply to U.S. citizens employed at
a naval base in Bermuda, which the U.S. had leased from
Great Britain. Id. at 378-79. The Court ruled extension of
FLSA coverage did not depend on whether the U.S. held sov-
ereignty in the political or any sense over the area in question,
so long as the U.S. government did exercise control. Id. at 381.
The Act, which was intended to protect Americans in their
employment, could be rightly applied if not inimical to the
laws and policies of host sovereign. Id. at 389. Thus, since the
U.S. exercised exclusive control over the leasehold, and the
Court was sure the Bermuda House of Assembly would not
enact legislation to control labor relations on the base, the
base qualified as a "possession" for FLSA purposes. Id. at
389-90.
U.S. control over the Venice base does qualify the site as
a "possession" for the purposes of environmental policy. The
lease in Vermilya-Brown was of fixed term, and conferred
upon the U.S. "all the rights, power and authority within the
Lease Areas which are necessary for the establishment, use,
operation and defence thereof, or appropriate for their con-
trol." Id. at 382 n.4. The U.S. holds the Venice base under no
specific agreement, for an indefinite term, and its control is so
exclusive the site is closed to the public. Also, even after the
base has been decommissioned no definite plans exist for re-
turning control to the Italian government. Because the degree
of U.S. control over the Venice base at least equals that
granted by the leasehold in Vermilya-Brown, it suffices to
make the site a possession. Therefore, the Venice base is a
"possession" for the purposes of U.S. environmental policy.
By its plain language then, E.O. 12,114 is not the "exclu-
sive and complete determination" of U.S. environmental pol-
icy at the Venice site, because the exclusivity applies only to
territories that are not possessions. E.O. 12,114 § 1-1. Since
NEPA has extraterritorial extent, and is not excluded from
covering the Venice base as a U.S. possession, E.O. 12,114 and
NEPA share coverage there. But it already has been shown
that in this event, NEPA must prevail because it has the force
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of law, and E.O. 12,114 is a nullity in any respect that it di-
verges from NEPA requirements. Because NEPA applies ex-
traterritorially, and E.O. 12,114 in no way dulls its effect, DoD
must comply with NEPA's EIS requirements.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia must
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION
December 2, 1991
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APPENDIX
CONSTITUTIONS
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
[The President] shall from time to time give to the con-
gress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend
to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge neces-
sary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, con-
vene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagree-
ment between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall
think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted; and shall Commission all the Officers of the United
States.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, or
other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admi-
ralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies be-
tween two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of
another State; - between Citizens of different States; - be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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STATUTES
Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 1-706 (1988)
§ 702 Right of Review
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking re-
lief other than money damages and stating a claim that an
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act
in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall
not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground
that is against the United States or that the United States is
an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a
defendant in any such action, and a judgment or- decree may
be entered against the United States: Provided, That any
mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal of-
ficer of officers (by name or by title), and their successors in
office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein
(1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or
duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any
other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers au-
thority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent
to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is
sought.
National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1988)
§ 4321 Congressional declaration of purpose
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment; to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natu-
ral resources important to the Nation; and to establish a
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council on Environmental Quality.
§ 4331 Congressional declaration of national environmen-
tal policy
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's
activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment, particularly the profound influences of popula-
tion growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion,
resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological
advances and recognizing further the critical importance of re-
storing and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the con-
tinuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with
State and local governments, and other concerned public and
private organizations, to use all practicable means and mea-
sure, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner
calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can ex-
ist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it
is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to
use all practicable means, consistent with the other essential
considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end
that the Nation may -
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trus-
tee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive,
and aesthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the envi-
ronment without degradation, risk to health or
safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural as-
pects of our national heritage, and maintain, wher-
ever possible, an environment which supports diver-
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sity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource
use which will permit high standards of living and a
wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and ap-
proach the maximum attainable recycling of deplet-
able resources.
(c) The congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibil-
ity to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment.
§ 4332 Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of infor-
mation; recommendations; international and national
coordination of efforts
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: ...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall - .
(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
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Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Fed-
eral official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any
Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special exper-
tise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Cop-
ies of such statement and comments and views of the appro-
priate Federal, State and local agencies, which are authorized
to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be
made available to the President, the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of
Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the ex-
isting agency review processes;
(F) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of envi-
ronmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign
policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to ini-
tiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize in-
ternational cooperation in anticipating and preventing a de-
cline in the quality of mankind's world environment;
(H) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning
and development of resource-oriented projects; and
(I) assist the Council on Environmental Quality ....
§ 4344 Duties and functions [of the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality]
It shall be the duty and function of the Council - .
(3) to review and appraise the various programs and ac-
tivities of the Federal Government . . . and to make
recommendations to the President with respect [to
the general policies of NEPA];
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980), reprinted in.42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
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ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF MAJOR
FEDERAL ACTIONS
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States, and as President of
the United States, in order to further environmental objec-
tives consistent with the foreign policy and national security
policy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
Section 1
1-1 Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this Executive Order is to enable respon-
sible officials of Federal agencies having ultimate responsibil-
ity for authorizing and approving actions encompassed by this
Order to be informed of pertinent environmental considera-
tions and to take such considerations into account, with other
pertinent considerations of national policy, in making deci-
sions regarding such actions. While based on independent au-
thority, this Order furthers the purpose of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act and the Marine Protection Research
and Sanctuaries Act and the Deepwater Port Act consistent
with the foreign policy and national security policy of the
United States, and represents the United States government's
exclusive and complete determination of the procedural and
other actions to be taken by Federal agencies to further the
purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act with re-
spect to the environment outside the United States, its terri-
tories and possessions.
2-3 Actions Included.
Agencies in their procedures . . . shall establish proce-
dures by which their officers having ultimate responsibility for
authorizing and approving actions in one of the following cat-
egories encompassed by this Order, take into consideration in
making decisions concerning such actions, a document de-
scribed in Section 2-4(a):
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(a) Major Federal actions significantly affecting the
environment of the global commons outside the
jurisdiction of any nation (e.g. the oceans or
Antarctica);
(b) major Federal actions significantly affecting the
environment of a foreign nation not participating
with the United States and not otherwise involved
in the action;
(c) major Federal actions significantly affecting the
environment of a foreign nation which provide to
that nation;
(1) a product, or physical project producing a
principal product or an emission or effluent,
which is prohibited or strictly regulated by
Federal law in the United States because its
toxic effects on the environment create a
serious public health risk; or
(2) a physical project which in the United States
is prohibited or strictly regulated by Federal
law to protect the environment against radio-
active substances.
(d) major Federal actions outside the United States,
its territories and possessions which significantly
affect natural or ecological resources of global
importance designated for protection under this
subsection by the President, or, in the case of
such a resource protected by international agree-
ment binding on the United States, by the
Secretary of State. Recommendations to the Presi-
dent under this subsection shall be accompanied
by the views of the Council on Environmental
Quality and the Secretary of State.
2-4 Applicable Procedures.
(a) There are the following types of documents to be
used in connection with actions described in
Section 2-3:
(i) environmental impact statements (including
generic, program and specific statements);
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(ii) bilateral or multilateral environmental stud-
ies, relevant or related to the proposed
action, by the United States and one or
more foreign nations, or by an international
body or organization in which the United
States is a member or participant; or
(iii) concise reviews of the environmental issues
involved, including environmental assess-
ments, summary environmental analyses or
other appropriate documents.
(b) Agencies shall in their procedures provide for
preparation of documents described in section 2-
4(a), with respect to actions described in section
2-3, as follows:
(i) for effects described in Section 2-3(a), an
environmental impact statement described in
Section 2-4(a)(i);
(ii) for effects described in Section 2-3(b), a
document described in Section 2-4(a)(ii) or
(iii), as determined by the agency;
(iii) for effects described in Section 2-3(c), a
document described in Section 2-4(a)(ii) or
(iii), as determined by the agency;
(iv) for effects described in Section 2-3(d), a
document described in Section 2-4(a)(i), (ii)
or (iii), as determined by the agency.
Such procedures may provide that an agency need not
prepare a new document when a document described in Sec-
tion 2-4(a) exists.
Sec. 3.
3-1 Rights of Action.
This Order is solely for the purpose of establishing inter-
nal procedures for Federal agencies to consider the significant
effects of their actions on the environment outside the Unites
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States, its territories and possessions, and nothing in this Or-
der shall be construed to create a cause of action.
47
